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.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRANK R. GEORGE, dba
GEORGE & SON CONSTRUCTION,
Plaintiff-Respondent

••
••
••

vs.

Case NoG 18359
••

OREN LIMITED & ASSOCIATES,
A Partnership,

••

Defendant-Appellant

.•

/

/

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was brought by FRANK R. GEORGE, dba GEORGE &
SON CONSTRUCTION, Plaintiff-Respondent, against OREN LIMITED &
ASSOCIATES, a Partnership, for judgment of $42,687.57, plus
interest, costs and attorney's fees for services and materials
provided in the installation of a sewer line, culinary water
service, and road grading, and for a lien against the property
so served.
Defendant counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract in timely performance.
Defendant further claimed as an affirmative defense that
Plaintiff was not a licensed contractor and therefore unable to
maintain the action.
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DISPOSTION BELOW
Trial of this action was to a jury, who by special
interrogatories, awarded the Plaintiff damages against the
Defendant in the amount of $58,482.41 and attorney's fees
of $2,700.00.
Prior to trial, Defendants moved for an Order of
Dismissal (R-131) which was heard before The Honorable Judge
Douglas Cornaby and the motion denied, pending evidence to
be submitted at trial (R-139-140).
The motion was renewed at time of trial (Transcript
p. 141) and was denied.
After entry of verdict, Defendant filed a Motion for
Judgment of Dismissal Non Obstante Veridico (N.O.V.)

(R-249-250).

The motion was heard on Wednesday, March 3, 1982, pursuant to
notice (R-259).

The motion was denied (R-261) and judgment on

the verdict entered.
Defendant appeals the denial of an Order of Dismissal
of The Honorable Judge Douglas Cornaby entered February 8,
1982 {Transcript p. 141) and the denial of a Motion to Dismiss
on March 5, 1982.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have the jury verdict and
the judgment entered thereon reversed and vacated and the
Plaintiff's Complaint dismissed.

Defendant-Appeallant alleges

that failure to grant Judgment of Dismissal was an error in law.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Respondent GEORGE and Defendant-Appellant
entered into a series of construction contracts in May of
1979 whereby Plaintiff-Respondent GEORGE would trench and
install a sewer line, a water line, grade and blacktop, as
well as install curb, gutter and sidewalls on certain subdivision property in Davis County, Utah (Exhibitis "B", "C",
"D" and "E") •
At the time of entering into the contract to provide
~

improvements to the land, the Plaintiff-Respondent was not
licensed with the Department of Business Regulation as a
contractor in any capacity (Transcript p. 17-18).

Plaintiff-

Respondent GEORGE had licensed for the year 1969 and had not
re-licensed until 1980.

In connection with the reasons for

which Plaintiff-Respondent was not licensed, on page 53 of
the Transcript, he states:

"Q

Any other reason you didn't license in 1970 or

in subsequent years?
A

Yes, there was a reason.

Q

What was that?

A

I didn't like the bureaucracy that dominated that

sort of thing."
On page 64 of the Transcript Plaintiff-Appellant
states:
"Q

You indicated, Mr. George, you didn't like the

- 3 -
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bureaucracy.

Why didn't you like the bureaucracy of the

licensing department?
A

Well, it was my contention they were revenue

raising agencies.

They are not a regulator.

They don't

know whether I know what I am doing or not."
JOSEPH KAPLAN, chief executive officer of OREN LTD.,
a rec:ent immigrant, one of the partners, did not know the
Plaintiff-Respondent FRANK GEORGE (transcript p. 205).

Mr.

Kaplan responded:
"Q

At the time you entered into the contract, did

you know Mr. George?

A

No.

Q

Had you ever met him?

A

My first and only meeting was at Jim Bird's office

until yesterday.

Q

That was your last meeting until yesterday?

A

Yes.

Q

Would you have contracted with Mr. Bird if you had

known he was not licensed?
A

You mean Mr. George?

Q

I mean Mr. George, I am sorry.

A

I don't think so.

censing means in America.

Q

I would have inquired what li-

But I don't believe I would because.

I have no further questions."

- 4 -
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The Plaintiff-Respondent GEORGE stated (Transcript p. 4)
that he knew Jack Sullivan some twenty years ago.
"Q

And do you know a Mr. Jack or John Sullivan?

A

Yes sir, I do.

Q

Okay, how do you know him?

A

I

knew Jack Sullivan first as.ooa ••o he lived in

.my neighborhood some twenty years ago."
When Sullivan was questioned about his connection with
GEORGE, he responded (Transcript p. 114):
"A

I

had known Frank for a number of years.

I

con-

sidered him to be an honorable man."
When questioned more carefully about Sullivan's acquaintance with Mr. George, he said (Transcript po 211-212):

"Q

Now in your previous testimony, you said you had

known Mr. George before you entered into this contract with him.
What was the nature of your acquaintanceship with Mr. George?
A

We were neighbors for about nine years, from late '57

up to '66.

Q

All right.

During that time did you ever contract

with Mr. George?

A

No.

Q

Were you ever a shareholder or a partner of any

business entities that contracted with Mr. George?
A

No, I had no business dealings.
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Q

Did you know what his business was at that time?

A

Yes, I understood that he was--

Q

Had you ever had any conversations at that time with

anyone who had done business with Mr. George?
A

No particular discussions.

I

had an associate that

George was doing a job for at Clearfield.

Q

That was at a later time, was it not?

A

No, that was just a little earlier time.

Q

A little earlier than this contract?

A

Yes, uh-huh.

Q

All right.

Now other than that, did you have any
/

/

acquaintance with Mr. George?
A

No.

Q

You never had any financial dealings with him?

A

None.

Q

Well, would you have contracted with Mr. George had you

known he was not licensed?
A

Absolutely not."

The foregoing is not a summary but is the complete record
of the knowledge and prior acquaintance which Mr. Joseph Kaplan
and Mr. Jack Sullivan had with Plaintiff-Respondent Frank George.
Mr. George did not post a bond or other security (Tran~cript

p. 64).

Mr. George had to take a competency exam to become licensed
after 11-1/2 years of unlicensed status (Transcript p. 66).
Mr. George held himself out to be a contractor, submitted
bids and otherwise engaged in contracting work for 11-1/2 years
(Transcript pp. 5, 9, 17, 18 and others).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED,
AS THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAPACITY TO SUE IN THE
COURTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND IS THUS PRECLUDED
FROM OBTA~NING DAMAGES.
The Plaintiff seeks to recover for services and
materials he rendered as a contractor.

In order for the

Plaintiff to state a claim, he must allege that at the time
the work was performed and the materials furnished, he was
licensed as a contractor under the laws of the State of Utah.
58-23-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, states:
License required for contracting--Prima facie
evidence of contracting.--It shall be unlawful for
any person, firm, copartnership, corporation, association, or other organization, or any combination
of any thereof, to engage in the business or act in
the capacity of contractor within this state without having a license therefor as herein provided,
unless such person, firm, copartnership, .corporation,
association, or other organization is particularly
exempted as provided in this act. Evidence of the
securing of any construction or building permit from
a government agency, or the employment of any person
on a construction project, or the offering of any
bid to do the work of a contractor as herein defined,
shall be accepted in any court of the state of Utah
as prirna f acie evidence of engaging in the business
or acting in the capacity of a contractor.
Also, 58-23-18 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
states:
Acting as contractor without license--Misdemeanor. --Any person, firm, copartnership, corporation, association, or other organization, acting in
the capacity of contractor within the meaning of
this act, without a license as herein provided shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor.

- 7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The above cited statutes have been almost uniformly
interpreted by the courts of this and other states in such a
way as to preclude enforcement of payment under a contract
when the contractor was unlicensed.
In a series of cases in the State of Utah, the Utah
Supreme Court has held that an unlicensed contractor has no
standing in the courts.

Meridian Corporation v. McGlynn/

Carmaker Co., 567 P.2 1110,

(Utah 1977) citing Smith v.

American Packing & Provision Co., 130 P.2 951, 102 Ut. 351,
(1942), and Olsen v. Reese, 220 P.2 733, 114 Ut. 411,

(1948),

Chief Justice Ellett, speaking for the court stated:
This Court has held that the contracts of
unlicensed contractors are void.
In the case
of Olsen v. Reese we held:
The authorities are fairly uniform to the
effect that failure to obtain a license which
is required by a statute enacted solely for
revenue purposes does render contracts made
by the offending party void. On the other hand,
contracts made by an unlicensed contractor when
in violation of a statute passed for the protection of the public are held to be void and unenforceable. Our statute is so worded as to indicate a legislative intent to protect the citizens
from irresponsible contractors. The statute,
while not comprehensive provides for a small license fee. Control over the contractor is given
to the Department of Registration. Upon an
appropriate hearing, the department may, for unprofessional conduct, suspend or cancel the
license. Good reputation and integrity are essential to obtaining a license and the entire object
of the statute is protection of the public against
fraudulent and illegal practice, which have always
been recognized as a distinct characteristic of
statutes, which are not mere revenue measures.
The statute being enacted for the protection of
the public, Plaintiff's written contract is void.
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The case of Smith v. American Packing & Provision Co. held that it was necessary for a
plaintiff, where a license is required, to allege
that he had the license in order to state a cause
of action. A license in another state cannot be
substituted for a license in Utah.
The Plaintiff in this case is aware of our
clear prior holdings; however, he urges us to overrule the case of Olsen v. Reese (supra, footnote 3 ).
This we refuse to do. We think the case was properly decided, and we confirm the principles of law
therein stated to be the law of this state.
In the case of Mosley v. Johnson, 22 U.2d 348, 453 P.2d
149 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court decided a case very similar
to the one before the Court at this time.
In Mosely, the Court concluded that a contract entered
into by an unlicensed welldriller was void and unenforceable.
Regarding the Plaintiff's quantum meruit claim and lien claim,
the Court in·Mosely concluded by stating:
"A court will no more assist one who fails to
secure a required license to recover money by
means of a lien foreclosure than it will in an
action on the contract or on a theory of quantum meruit.
Since there is nothing due plaintiff in this matter • • • • "
The foregoing interpretation of contractor collection
efforts while in violation of State licensing laws is consistent
with the law of most states.
51 Am Jur. 2d Licenses and Permits Sec. 64 states:
Under a statute providing that a contractor cannot maintain an action unless he alleges and proves
that he was duly licensed at all times during the
performance of the contract or when his cause of action arose, it is commonly held that he cannot recover if he was not duly licensed at the time specified
in the statute or if his license had expired or been
revoked during the performance of the contract, regardless of whether he became duly licensed thereafter,
and regardless of the period that elapsed between the
time when he was not licensed and the time when he
became licensed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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See also 82 A.L.R. 2d 1429, 1443.

On some occasions

and for specific purposes the rule laid down by the foregoing
cases has been modified as in Fillmore Products v. Western
Paving, 561 P.2d 682.

In this case, while supporting the

general rule, the court set forth some exceptions.

In hold-

ing for the unlicensed contractor, Justice Wilkins, speaking
for the Court said:
We distinguish this case from those cited
in note 2.
In this case it is clear that an
unlicensed subcontractor is dealing with a
licensed general or original contractor. And
the defendants have not disputed that the entire sewer project was under the supervision
of a licensed project engineer, that all of
the work had to meet the specifications and
requirements of the general contract and that
all of the work had to be approved and accepted by the project engineer before any payment
was made by the Town of Ferron.
We distinguish the current case from the Fillmore Products case in that (1) the contractor was not acting as a
subcontractor to a general; Defendant-Appellant was a subdivider;
and (2) the project was not under the control or direction of a
project engineer.
The Court also deviated from the general rule in Lignell
v. Berg,

593 P.2d 800.

Again, while sustaining the general

rule, the Court set forth exceptions to the rule:
This Court has had frequent occasion to comment on the status of unlicensed contractors,
and has persistently construed the cited statute
as having been designed to protect the public
and consequently to bar recovery by unlicensed
contractors for services rendered under their
contracts. The most recent Utah cases so holding
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are Mosely v. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d
149, and Meridian Corp. v. McGlynn Carmaker Company, Utah, 567 P.2d 1110. The rationale of
those cases is, however, that the party from
whom the contractor seeks to ~ecover is in the
class the legislature intended to protect. A
litigant is not a member of that class if the
required protection (i.e., against inept and financially irresponsible builders) is in fact
afforded by another means • • •
In this case, the denital of recovery to BBC
would indeed impose unreasonable penalties and
forfeitures, particularly because the Owners were
never deprived of the kind of protection the licensing statute was designed to afford. We consider the following circumstances to be of controlling significance in this regard:
1. BBC has not failed to satisfy the licensing authority of its technical competence and
financial qualification for license. It had
inadvertently permitted its license to lapseo
Restoration of licensed status involved no new
demonstration of qualification, but only payment of fee.
2. The Owners didd not rely on any BBC competence they inferred from BBC's having advertised itself as a general contractor. They had
previously employed BBC as a builder in apartment
house construction. Moreover, the Owners unsurped
the general contractor's prerogatives in constructing the Terrace Incline complex. They relied on
their own competence.
3. BBC supplied a performance bond as well as
a labor and material suppliers payment bond. The
Owners were infinitely better assured or adequate
and complete performance without financial exposure beyond the contact price than they would have
been by BBC's mere compliance with the licensing
statute.
The Lignell case is likewise distinguishable from the
case before the Court.
(1)

Consider the following:

Plaintiff-Respondent GEORGE did not "just inadver-

tently" allow his license to lapse.

- 11 -

He had rebelled against
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the bureaucracy and for 11-1/2 years had practiced his trade
as a contractor without a license, contrary to civil and
criminal law.

Licensing (it couldn't be called re-licensing)

did not merely require payment of a fee--but required testing
and examination.

It did require a new demonstration of com-

petence.
{2)

In the Lignell case, the Owners knew contractor

in his professional capacity and had done work with the contractor previously.

Moreover, in Lignell the Owners became

their own general contractor, a stature they had taken before
with the unlicensed contractor.
In the case before the Court, the Defendants {one of
whom was a foreigner) had not had previous subdivision experience and had had no professional or trade experience with
Plaintiff-Respondent GEORGE.
him not at all.

Defendant-Appellant KAPLAN knew

Defendant-Appellant SULLIVAN knew him from

the neighborhood--and in no way professionally.

Professionally,

KAPLAN and SULLIVAN were "babes in the woods" as witness the
agreements for a complicated construction project {Exhibits "B",
"C" , "D" and "E") •
(3)

In the Lignell case, the contractor supplied a

materialmen's and labor bond.

The Court said they were better

off with a bond than by merely complying with the license
(does a bond legitimize a non-licensed contractor?)
case before the Court, no bond was posted.
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In the

Further,

Plaintiff~Respondent

GEORGE held himself out

to be a contractor, submitted bids, met with Defendant-Appellant OREN LTD. at the engineer's office, and did those things
characteristic of a licensed contractor.
Finally, in the 1981 General Session of the Utah State
Legislature, the following statute was enacted:

SSA-1-26, Utah

Code Annotated, 1953 as amended:
No contractor may act as agent or commence
or maintain any action in any court of the state
for collection of compensation for the perfor~
mance of any act for which a license is required
by this chapter without alleging and proving
that he was a duly licensed contractor when the
contract sued upon was entered into and when the
alleged cause of action arose.
We readily admit that this statute was not in existence
at the time the acts occurred which are the subject matter of
this lawsuit.

However, the passage of the statute demonstrates

a philosophical legislative intent and perhaps was occasioned
by the same time deviation from the general rule.
Defendant-Appellant prays relief as set forth ·above.
Respectfully submitted ·this ~ ~

day of June, 1982.
& WILKINSON

Lorin N. Pace
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
OREN LTD. & ASSOCIATES
1900 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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